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COSMETIC REPAIR TO A CRUMBLING
FOUNDATION: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF IDAHO’S MOST RECENT INDIGENT
DEFENSE LEGISLATION*
He who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great
ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble
to the architect and danger to the building. ~Machiavelli1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 670
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A GOOD INDIGENT
DEFENSE SYSTEM .................................................................. 673
A. The Constitutional Right to Counsel .................................... 674
B. Three Types of Indigent Defense Delivery Systems ............ 675
1. Dedicated Public Defender Office System ....................... 675
2. The Contract System ........................................................ 676
3. Assigned Counsel System ................................................. 676
C. National Indigent Defense Delivery Standards ................... 677
1. A Brief History of the ABA’s Ten Principles of
a Public Defense Delivery System .................................. 677
2. The Ten ABA Principles Examined ................................. 678
III. IDAHO’S CRUMBLING INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM ....... 684
A. How the Current Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho Are
Working ................................................................................. 684
1. Counties with Dedicated Public Defender
Offices ............................................................................... 686
2. Counties with the Contract System ................................. 688
3. Counties Using Other Systems ........................................ 691
B. Idaho’s Violations of the ABA Principles.............................. 692
1. Violations of ABA Principle 3 ........................................... 693
2. Violations of ABA Principle 4 and ABA
Principle 7......................................................................... 694
3. Violations of ABA Principle 6 and ABA
Principle 9......................................................................... 695
4. Violations of ABA Principle 10 ......................................... 695
C. A Cosmetic Patch: A Critical Examination of Idaho’s
Recent Legislative Attempt at Structural Repair ............... 696
1. Abolishment of Flat-Fee Contracts .................................. 698
While this issue has received much attention over the last year, as this article
*
goes to press, indigent defense in Idaho continues to crumble. However, the American Civil
Liberties Union’s (ACLU) litigation against the State has forced legislators to review the
possibility of indigent defense reform, which is a step in the right direction.
1. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE: BOLD-FACED PRINCIPLES ON TACTICS,
POWER AND POLITICS 79 (Rob McMahon ed., W.K. Marriott trans., Sterling Publishing 2008).

670

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 52

2. Idaho Public Defense Commission ................................... 699
IV. RECONSTRUCTING A SOLID FOUNDATION: IDAHO’S
NEED FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM ........................ 703
A. Idaho’s Third-Generation Litigation .................................... 706
B. Codifying the Ten ABA Principles ........................................ 708
C. State-managed, County-operated Dedicated Public
Defender Offices .................................................................... 709
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 713

I. INTRODUCTION
Ask any U.S. citizen to describe a right guaranteed to her by the
Constitution, and the likely answer will be quick: freedom.2 It is the first
thing schoolchildren learn about their country, and the only memory
that lasts a lifetime. But even though far fewer people could name them,
that one big right—being free—is built on a base of many smaller constitutional promises. Among those structural supports is the right to
counsel.3
For many people, the right to be free never hinges on their right to
counsel. But for criminal defendants, the rights are often intertwined:
no counsel, no freedom. In those cases, what happens to the broader
guarantee if there are cracks in the smaller, foundational right? Unfortunately, indigent defendants in Idaho are finding out.
Near the Clerk’s window in one Idaho courthouse hangs a sign
warning defendants, in bold type, that the services of its attorneys are
“NOT FREE!”4 While the sign means to describe the potential monetary
cost of having appointed counsel, it could just as easily be describing the
fate of most low-income defendants, who generally cannot afford proper
representation. Without the means to pay a lawyer—even a reducedcost public defender—indigent defendants often find themselves navigating a complicated legal system alone.

2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that the Constitution exists to “secure the
Blessings of Liberty” for U.S. citizens).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See generally Richard J. Wilson, Compelling Indigent Defendants to Pay the
Cost of Counsel Adds Up to Bad Policy, Bad Law, 3 CRIM. JUST. 16 (1988). The sign, which
really did exist, read in its entirety: “If you apply for a Public Defender and the service is
granted to you IT IS NOT FREE! You may be required to reimburse Nez Perce County.” The
sign no longer hangs near the clerk’s window. However, indigent defendants in Nez Perce
County are still warned that they may have to pay for the right to receive an attorney. On
the application for a public defender, the defendant is warned, in all capital letters right
above the signature line: “I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I MAY BE REQUIRED TO
REIMBURSE NEZ PERCE COUNTY FOR THE SERVICES OF THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER.” Affidavit of Financial Status, Application for Public Defender, and Order, Nez
Perce County (Oct. 2013) (blank application form) (on file with author). For the reader’s convenience, a copy of the Nez Perce County public defender application form is included as
Appendix A.
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That is a problem of constitutional magnitude. As the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, a person’s right to an attorney does not
depend on his ability to pay for one.5 But most indigent defendants do
not understand that they can be required to pay, if anything, only what
they can actually afford. Thus, because someone in an Idaho courthouse
chose to hang a sign that improperly informs defendants of the scope of
their right to counsel, those defendants could very well end up not free.
Although that sign is one of the most colorful examples of the problems within Idaho’s current indigent public defense system, it is far
from the only one.6 Indigent defendants in Idaho suffer the consequenc5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(noting that the “noble ideal” that “every defendant stands equal before the law . . . cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him”). Some states have adopted indigent-defense cost recovery, on the theory that it can
be psychologically beneficial for a near-indigent defendant to help with the cost of his defense. See generally Wilson, supra note 4.
6. For example, on June 17, 2015, class action litigation against the State (discussed in Part IV.A, infra) was filed on behalf of four named indigent defendants and other
similarly situated defendants who have not received constitutionally adequate counsel. Class
Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Tucker v. Idaho, No. CV-OC-201510240
(2015),
https://acluidaho.org/wpsite/wpcontent/uploads/ACLUIdahoPubDefenseComplaintFilestamp-sm.pdf
[hereinafter
Complaint].
These four, more recent—but equally egregious—examples of Idaho’s constitutional indigent defense failures show that Idaho’s most recent legislation (discussed in Part
III.C, infra) has done little to improve the state of indigent defense since the Defender’s Association’s grim report in 2010:
Officers arrested Tracy Tucker in Bonner County on March 6, 2015. Id. at 3. No
attorney represented Tucker at his first appearance where the judge set bail at $40,000. Id.
at 4. Tucker was unable to make bail or make any arguments as to why bail should be reduced. Id. Thus, Tucker remained in jail for three months. Id. Over the course of those three
months, Tucker met with his attorney for a total of twenty minutes over three meetings of
which two were at Tucker’s court appearances. Id. Tucker tried to contact his attorney by
phone over fifty times but was unable to reach his attorney. Id. Tucker’s attorney was so
overburdened that even ten days before Tucker’s trial date, he had not done any meaningful
discovery or investigation. Id. Tucker faced up to fifteen years in prison after he pled guilty
to attempted strangulation. Id.
Similarly, “officers arrested Jason Sharp in Shoshone County [o]n May 16, 2014
pursuant to a warrant charging burglary and grand theft.” Id. Sharp also was not assigned
counsel during his first appearance and bail was set at $50,000. Id. Unlike Tucker, however,
Sharp was able to convince the court to release him so he would not lose his job. Id. at 4–5. In
the year after his release, Sharp was unable to communicate effectively with his attorney. Id.
at 5. His attorney did not provide him, even after he requested it, with discovery materials
relating to the state’s evidence against him. Id. Sharp’s attorney did not file any substantive
motions, like suppression motions, on Sharp’s behalf except for motions to continue his trial.
Id. Sharp faced up to thirty years in prison if convicted. Id.
Named Plaintiff Naomi Morley was arrested for DUI and possession of controlled substance on March 14, 2014 in Ada County after she was involved in a car accident.
Id. Morley’s bail was set at $15,000, which she could not afford and she remained in jail for
three weeks despite her serious injuries caused by the accident. Id. at 5–6. Morley’s attorney
told her that if she wanted experts to challenge the state’s evidence, she would have to pay
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es of altogether inconsistent, county-implemented systems that are failing to provide even the bare minimums of the constitutional right to
counsel. Idaho is in desperate need of indigent defense reform.
After the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (Defender Association) released a report about the dismal state of Idaho indigent defense services in 2010,7 the Idaho Legislature has glacially and incompletely moved toward reform. In the last eighteen months, the Legislature has taken two steps forward,8 but neither of those has addressed
the underlying structural problems Idaho faces.9 Instead, the recent
measures are nothing more than a new coat of paint on a crumbling
foundation.
Idaho is at a critical juncture, and has to choose: should it continue
to gloss over precarious and systemic flaws, or should it take its public
defense delivery method down to the studs and rebuild? This Article
suggests that now is the time for Idaho to construct a more sustainable
system for delivering indigent defense services.
To give Idaho a head start in doing so, Part II of this Article describes the attributes of a good public defense system, including the confor them herself. Id. at 6. Without the help of her attorney, Morley herself obtained a sworn
affidavit from the person acknowledging responsibility. Id. Morley’s attorney was so overburdened that he had no time to review Morley’s extensive notes on the police reports and
did not investigate the vehicle before the state destroyed it (and the evidence it contained).
Id. Morley believed her attorney was pressuring her into a plea agreement due to lack of
resources and time to prepare for trial. Id. Instead of taking a plea deal for ten years in prison, Morley faced up to fifteen years in prison if convicted at her trial. Id.
Jeremy Payne spent five months in jail after officials arrested him for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Id. Payne was unable to afford bail,
which was set at $30,000, but was released from jail after the State failed to bring a timely
trial. Id. at 6–7. Even though Payne was assigned a public defender, he went unrepresented
at his first appearance. Id. at 6. Additionally, while he was in jail, Payne was unable to
communicate with his attorney. Id. at 7. Payne’s meetings with his attorney at the jail and in
court, immediately before court appearances, were always extremely brief, totaling between
thirty and forty-five minutes since Payne was arrested. Id. Payne’s trial was continued three
times and he faced seven years in prison if convicted at trial. Id.
On January 22, 2016, the Idaho district court judge presiding over the case
dismissed the ACLU’s lawsuit stating that the lawsuit “invites the court to make speculative
assumptions regarding the outcomes of individual cases” and presume “that all indigent
criminal defendants in all counties are recieiving the same ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Kimberlee Kruesi, Idaho Judge Dismisses ACLU Lawsuit Over Public Defense, WASHINGTON
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/22/judge-dismissesaclu-public-defense-lawsuit/. The judge did, however, agree that Idaho’s indigent defense
system is problematic. Id. Unsurprisingly, the ACLU appealed the ruling. Betsy Z. Russell,
ACLU Appeals Dismissal of Public Defense Lawsuit, SPOKESMAN.COM (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2016/jan/25/aclu-appeals-dismissal-public-defenselawsuit/.
7. See generally Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, The Guarantee of Counsel: Advocacy & Due Process in Idaho’s Trial Courts, BOISE WEEKLY (Jan. 2010),
http://www.boiseweekly.com/pdf/idaho_report.pdf [hereinafter NLADA].
8. IDAHO CODE §19-850 (2015); IDAHO CODE §19-859 (2015).
9. David Carroll, Idaho Governor Signs Public Defense Commission Bill Into Law,
SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (April 1, 2014), http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-governor-signspublic-defense-commission-bill-into-law/.
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stitutional right to counsel and the different models of indigent defense
delivery available to states and local governments. Part III focuses on
the current methods of indigent defense delivery services being used in
Idaho, the inherent problems with those systems, and the recent legislative action aimed at fixing those problems. It argues that both statutes
are inadequate to produce sustainable reform in Idaho. Finally, Part IV
illustrates the real damage Idaho faces due to pending litigation, which
resulted from failing to achieve reform, and suggests that State oversight is the best solution for Idaho’s failing system. It proposes that Idaho should take over responsibility for providing constitutionally mandated counsel using county-operated, dedicated public defense offices.
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A GOOD INDIGENT DEFENSE
SYSTEM
Forty years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided this issue in
1963, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that:
It is the public policy of this state, disclosed by constitutional
guarantees as well as by numerous provisions of the statutes, to
accord to every person accused of a crime, not only a fair and
impartial trial, but every reasonable opportunity to prepare his
defense and to vindicate his innocence upon a trial. In a case of
indigent persons accused of crime, the court must assign counsel
to the defense at public expense.10
Thus, even before the U.S. Supreme Court took on the issue, Idaho
understood the important public policy of providing legal defense services to its poor.11
While the Idaho Supreme Court’s words are powerful, this important public policy is unrecognizable in the State today.12 It is unidentifiable because Idaho is one out of only three states that provides no
state-level financial support for its indigent defense services.13 And because Idaho has abandoned this important public policy by not implementing state-supported public defense, it continually fails to meet
foundational right to counsel minimums.
10. State v. Montroy, 217 P. 611, 614, 37 Idaho 684, 690 (1923).
11. See id.
12. See
Idaho
Project
Page,
SIXTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER,
http://sixthamendment.org/what-we-do/our-current-projects/idaho-project-page/ (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016).
13. Id.; Morgan Boydston, Idaho, ACLU Go to Court Over Public Defense System,
KTVB.COM (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.ktvb.com/story/news/local/2015/12/17/judge-hears- arguments-in-public-defense-case-against-state/77463752/. Idaho does not provide any statelevel financing for trial-level, non-capital indigent defense. See Idaho Project Page, supra
note 12.
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A. The Constitutional Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures
that defendants are afforded the assistance of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions.14 And the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment––making
the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States––ensures that all defendants are guaranteed that right.15
The Supreme Court famously interpreted the Sixth Amendment
when it decided Gideon v. Wainwright16 in 1963. In Gideon, Florida
charged the defendant, Gideon, with breaking and entering with intent
to commit a misdemeanor, a felony in Florida.17 Gideon asked the Florida trial court to appoint him a lawyer.18 The trial court stated it could
not appoint counsel because Florida did not charge Gideon with a capital offense––a requirement for appointment of counsel.19 On appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that not only did precedent require it to
find that indigent defendants are entitled to the right to counsel but also
that “reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”20 A concurring Justice
noted “[t]hat the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in
‘all criminal prosecutions’ is clear, both from the language of the
Amendment and from this Court’s interpretation”21 and went on to say
that the Sixth Amendment’s right to assistance of counsel provision does
not distinguish between capital cases and non-capital cases.22
In Gideon, the Court made it clear that––through the Fourteenth
Amendment––each state is responsible for implementing the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of counsel and for delivering the assistance of
counsel to its indigent defendants.23 The state itself is ultimately responsible.24 If a state chooses to delegate this responsibility to its counties or local governments, the state is not then relieved of its obligation.25 States must ensure that its counties and local governments are
providing the minimum constitutionally required indigent defense services and must intervene if those systems are failing.26 Thus, if the local-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963).
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 348 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.
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ly implemented indigent defense delivery systems are collapsing, responsibility reverts to the state.27
Idaho has chosen to delegate its constitutional responsibility to
counties and has left it up to each county to determine the method of
supplying indigent defense services.28 This county-specific patchworkquilt of systems contributes to Idaho’s crumbling indigent defense foundation.
B. Three Types of Indigent Defense Delivery Systems
States (and local governments) have choices when determining how
to provide public defender services to its indigent citizens: a state can
choose to regulate indigent defense services at the state level or pass its
responsibilities on to local governments.29 Delivering indigent defense
services is the state’s responsibility according to the Fourteenth
Amendment and Gideon.30 In attending to its responsibility, a state—or
local government entity if the state chooses to shift its responsibility—
can deliver indigent defense services in three typical ways: 1) through a
dedicated public defender office, 2) through a contract system, or 3)
through an assigned counsel system.31
1. Dedicated Public Defender Office System
If a state or local government chooses the first model, it means that
there will be a dedicated public defender’s office.32 These offices are typically situated near the courthouse and are usually staffed with attorneys, support staff, and––in larger offices––with social workers and investigators.33 All hired parties are government employees and are paid
by the state.34

27. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.
28. See generally NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.
29. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 2.
30. See supra Part II.A.
31. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 14. However, Idaho has a few counties that choose
none of the three systems listed. Those counties are discussed in detail below. See also Scott
Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 31
S. U. L. Rev. 245, 249 (2004).
32. Wisconsin uses this model and operates a main dedicated public defender
branch office in Madison. Wisconsin has also established branch locations throughout the
state to deliver indigent defense services. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
33. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
34. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
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Even though the dedicated public defender office model is the optimal system because it best protects indigent defendant rights and public
defense standards, dedicated offices are expensive to operate.35
A state or local government may not have the resources or the clients to warrant a dedicated office.36 If lack of resources or client base is
a problem, States or local governments may decide to implement another less expensive system such as the contract system or assigned counsel
system.37
2. The Contract System
Sometimes states or local governments choose the second model––
the contract system.38 In the contract model, a state or county contracts
with a law firm, a non-profit organization, or individual attorneys to
handle a certain type of case or a certain number of cases.39 The individual attorney or office is paid a contractually agreed rate to deliver all
indigent defense services.40
Some of the features of this model include contracts that are administered by an independent oversight commission and include strict
caseload controls, training, and extra funding for investigators and experts.41 Even though this system is an effective delivery system,42 other
states and local governments have decided that neither the dedicated
office nor contract system is right for its citizens and have implemented
the assigned counsel system as a way to provide indigent defense services.
3. Assigned Counsel System
The assigned counsel system, the third model, allows attorneys to
agree to have their names placed on an assigned counsel roster that
judges use to assign attorneys to indigent defendants on an as-needed

35. StreetLaw, Inc., Chasing Gideon: Issues in Public Defense (2013),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ve
d=0ahUKEwiUyKyOqqXLAhVK6mMKHe2NC7UQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.s
treetlaw.org%2FDocuments%2FDocument%2FDocument%2F1436&usg=AFQjCNEFsoB6Cf3md3
6Mf19YZnv1k7w7XA.
36. See id.
37. See infra Part II.B.2 & II.B.3.
38. Oregon uses this contract model and delivers defense services through a mixture of private attorney contracts and non-profit organization contracts. The contractors
provide indigent defense representation at the county level. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
39. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
40. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
41. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
42. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
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basis.43 Judges rotate the attorneys on the roster and the attorneys are
paid by the hour or by the case.44
A state using this assigned counsel system provides direct supervision at the local level to ensure compliance with national and state
standards.45 If the assigned attorneys are paid an hourly rate, in this
system, the hourly rate can incrementally increase based on factors such
as attorney caseload and specific case complexity.46
Of course, the available indigent defense delivery models are three
common ways in which States and local governments can provide these
services. But indigent defense delivery systems must also be guided by
structural and individualized representation standards.
C. National Indigent Defense Delivery Standards
National associations like the Defender Association and the American Bar Association (ABA) have developed standards for adequate indigent defense standards.47 These types of associations play leadership
roles in developing standards for indigent defense systems and indigent
defense representation.48 These standards are not binding on the states
or local governments, but they do guide policy makers as they enact jurisdiction-specific indigent defense statutes.49
1. A Brief History of the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System
Before the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (principles) were developed and adopted in 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice compiled national guiding standards in a five-volume
work.50 These standards were available to attorneys, policy-makers, and
public defense leaders.51 However, the standards needed to be revised,
updated, and distilled to better reflect the problems affecting indigent
defense services and to help guide policymakers in a more succinct
way.52

43. Massachusetts uses the assigned counsel system. The state utilizes an independent indigent defense commission in Boston. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
44. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
45. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
46. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.
47. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252.
48. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252.
49. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 253.
50. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252.
51. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252.
52. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252.
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The principles’ purpose is to distill the voluminous national standards for indigent defense systems down to their most basic elements.53
The principles are based on papers written by major players in the indigent defense arena.54 Those papers referenced all the then-present national indigent defense delivery standards, which contained over three
decades of black-letter principles.55 Because there were three decades of
black-letter principles available, officials and policy makers needed a
succinct, easily reviewed and applied compilation.56
The principles are a reference point for discussion of the ten most
important areas of indigent defense standards.57 The ABA House of Delegates recommends that jurisdictions use the principles as an easy way
to assess the needs of its public defense delivery system and then communicate those needs to the policymakers who are responsible for designing public defense delivery systems.58 The principles help guide government officials and policy makers when designing indigent defense
systems that provide effective and efficient representation for indigent
defendants.59 Since their adoption, the principles have been instrumental in states’ efforts to improve public defense systems.60
2. The Ten ABA Principles Examined
Each of the ABA’s ten principles are interdependent and an indigent defense system cannot be critiqued by averaging the performance
under each principle.61 For example, a jurisdiction cannot simply meet
seven out of the ten principles and then conclude that it is meeting the
needs of indigent defendants.62 The defense delivery system used must
meet performance standards under each one of the principles for the
jurisdiction to conclude that the system is meeting constitutional minimums.63 Close is not good enough.

53. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 258–59.
54. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259 n.21.
55. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259 n.21.
56. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259.
57. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259.
58. Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, ABA’s Principles of Public Defense, 17-SUM
CRIM. JUST. 68, 68 (2002).
59. See generally American Bar Association, ABA, Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery
System
(Feb.
2002),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Ten Principles].
60. Brooks & Deoras, supra note 58, at 68–69 (discussing the use of the principles
in Texas, Montana, Georgia, and Michigan).
61. NLADA, supra note 7, at 6.
62. See generally NLADA, supra note 7, at 6.
63. NLADA, supra note 7, at 6.

2016

COSMETIC REPAIR TO A CRUMBLING
FOUNDATION: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF IDAHO’S MOST RECENT INDIGENT
DEFENSE LEGISLATION

679

The public defense function, including the selection,
funding, and payment of defense counsel, is independent.
~ ABA Principle 164
Principle 1 requires that indigent defense system be free from political influence, judiciary oversight, and be maintained by a non-partisan
commission.65 Principle 1 also suggests that the chief defender and staff
defenders should be awarded the positions based on merit and should
involve goals of diversity recruitment in staff.66 A public defense system
must be free from political attacks in order for it to achieve ethical client
representation goals.67 This principle is especially important when a
state or local government uses a dedicated public defender office.68
Where a chief public defender is appointed by a government official, political influence concerns increase because the focus is on influencing
appointment decisions and not indigent defendants.69
Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system consists of both a defender office
and the active participation of the private bar. ~ ABA
Principle 270
Principle 2 allows for the state bar’s participation when caseloads
exceed expectations, meaning that a state bar association may alleviate
defender workload by appointing part-time defenders, contracting for
services, or by implementing a controlled assigned counsel procedure.71
Excessive workloads are a contributing factor in poor indigent defense
systems because, if attorneys are facing excessive workloads, it means
that they do not have adequate time to spend with each client.72 Involving the private bar when caseloads become overwhelming helps public
defenders diligently represent their clients.73
64. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
65. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
66. See Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2.
67. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 260.
68. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 260.
69. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 261.
70. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
71. Id. at 2.
72. See The Constitution Project, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of
Our Constitutional Right to Counsel, Report of the National Right to Counsel Committee, 66
(2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [hereinafter
Justice Denied]; see also NLADA, supra note 7, at 6.
73. See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants,
Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads (August 2009),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter
Eight
Guidelines]; American Council of Chief Defenders Statement on Caseloads and Workloads,
American Council of Chief Defenders, National Legal Aid & Defender Association (August
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Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is
assigned and notified of appointment, as soon as feasible
after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for counsel. ~
ABA Principle 374
The ABA’s principle 3 addresses the need for early eligibility
screening and counsel appointment.75 Eligibility screening needs to be
uniform and needs to treat defendants with limited resources equally.76
Counsel needs to be provided for the defendant within twenty-four
hours after he is arrested, detained, or requests counsel.77 Appointing
counsel to defendants early in the adjudicatory process helps ensure
that defendant’s rights are protected because counsel is there to help
explain and safeguard the defendant’s legal rights.78
Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and confidential space within which to meet with clients. ~ ABA Principle 479
Principle 4 ensures attorneys are provided with confidential meeting spaces so that the attorney’s client feels free to openly discuss his
case with his attorney.80 This requires private meeting spaces in jails,
prisons, and courthouses.81 The availability of private meeting spaces
ensures that the attorney’s professional ethical obligations are protected
and preserves attorney-client confidential information.82 After all, where
life and liberty are at stake, it is important that a client trust his public
defender and it is hard for him to build that trust with his defender if
the communications are not private.83
Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the
rendering of quality representation. ~ ABA Principle 584
Principle 5 requires caseload control.85 An attorney’s workload
should never be so high that counsel would be forced to breach ethical
obligations, nor should it be so high that it interferes with counsel’s ability to provide quality representation.86 An attorney who tries to repre24,
2007),
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1189179200.71/EDITEDFINALVERSIONACCDCAS
ELOADSTATEMENTsept6.pdf [hereinafter ACCD].
74. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
75. Id.
76. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 265.
77. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 267.
83. See id.
84. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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sent too many clients is limited in the number of hours she can spend
with each client, thus the defense she presents on behalf of her client
suffers.87 A jurisdiction that allows the attorney to carry private cases in
addition to her public defender workload must make sure that the attorney’s entire workload is considered for caseload maximums.88 If there
is ever a point in which counsel feels that her workload is too overwhelming, counsel is obligated to decline further appointment of indigent defendants or take on more cases.89 Particularly, contract defenders
should have a release valve for excess caseloads or overly complex cases.90
Several organizations provide guidance on public defender caseload
limits and benchmarks.91 These types of caseload limit guidelines set a
maximum number for the specific types of cases attorneys should be
handling on a yearly basis.92 For example, the American Counsel of
Chief Defenders suggests that a single felony attorney should not take
on more than 150 felony cases per year.93
Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match
the complexity of the case. ~ ABA Principle 694
For this principle, it is the appointed counsel’s responsibility to refuse assignment of a case if he lacks the experience or training needed
to provide ethical, high quality representation.95 This principle is usually implemented by classifying attorneys according to their training and
experience.96 For example, death penalty cases are unique and complex
therefore they require special attorney qualifications.97

87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 1.
90. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
91. See, e.g., Eight Guidelines, supra note 73; ACCD, supra note 73.
92. See, e.g., Eight Guidelines, supra note 73; ACCD, supra note 73.
93. A misdemeanor attorney should not take more than 400 non-traffic misdemeanors per year; a juvenile attorney should not take on more than 200 juvenile cases per
year; a civil commitments attorney should not take on more than 200 mental health cases
per year; and an appellate attorney should not take on more than 25 non-capital appeals per
year. National caseload standards should never be exceeded. See, e.g., Eight Guidelines, supra note 73; ACCD, supra note 73.
94. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
95. Id.
96. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 263.
97. Id. at 264.
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The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case. ~ ABA Principle 798
Principle 7 recommends vertical representation––where the same
attorney represents the client from the beginning of the case through
the trial’s completion and sentencing.99 Vertical representation does not
necessarily extend through all appeals because in an appeal, the client
should be assigned an attorney who has appellate expertise.100 But the
assigned appellate attorney should represent the client until the direct
appeal’s completion.101
While horizontal representation—where one attorney sees all clients in a particular stage of the process before passing the client on to
the attorney responsible for the next stage—is a mechanism used to
save time and money, it inhibits the establishment of the attorney-client
relationship.102 Vertical representation helps to solidify the relationship
plus helps to build trust between client and attorney.103
There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources and defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the justice system. ~ ABA
Principle 8104
Principle 8 requires that the financial resources available to indigent defense attorneys should match those available to the prosecution.105 Defense attorneys and prosecutors should receive equal treatment in areas such as access to support staff, investigators, experts, and
personal benefits.106 And contract based defense attorneys should never
be selected primarily on the basis of lowest fee.107 This treatment ensures that indigent defendants are afforded the ability to present a defense proportional to the prosecution’s case.108 Public defenders should
have the same amount of resources that are provided to the prosecution;
they should be equal.109

98. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 263.
103. See id.
104. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
105. Id. at 3. In Idaho, in 2014, the amount spent on public defense throughout the
counties was $14,001,709 whereas the counties collectively spent $21,924,407 on prosecuting
attorney services. These numbers suggest that there was not parity between the prosecutorial and defense functions. Jared Hoskins, LSO PACKET FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER INTERIM
COMMITTEE MEETING (on file with author).
106. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
107. Id.
108. See generally id. This principle assumes that the prosecutor in a particular jurisdiction is adequately funded and well supported.
109. Id.
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Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend
continuing legal education. ~ ABA Principle 9110
Defense attorneys and support staff should be provided with systematic and comprehensive training in their practice area.111 And, in
harmony with Principle 8, the education should be equal to what the
prosecutor receives.112 This principle is the first to endorse a requirement of mandatory continuing legal education for public defense attorneys.113
Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally
and locally adopted standards. ~ ABA Principle 10114
Principle 10 requires that defense attorneys be supervised and reviewed on a periodic basis.115 In addition to public defenders, support
staff should be evaluated from time to time to ensure quality representation and competence.116 More specifically, attorneys should be evaluated against performance standards, which prescribe basic duties the
attorney is expected to perform during all litigation stages.117
Many states, local governments, and professional organizations
throughout the country use the principles as a “best practices” tool to
guide public defenders or model their own legislation after the principles.118 The ABA principles serve as the structural framework needed to
build a sturdy foundation of a public defense delivery system. States or
local governments can use the principles to construct a constitutionally
sound indigent defense system.

110. Id. at 1.
111. Id. at 3.
112. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
113. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 264.
114. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 268.
118. See, e.g., Policy and Leadership, PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/ResJune11_2?appNum=4 (last visited January 24,
2015) (presenting a Resolution of the Philadelphia Bar Association Adopting and Endorsing
the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Delivery System); Guidelines on
Indigent Defense Services Delivery Systems, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (2006),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fwTzyTmupEY%3D&tabid=2326
(last
visited January 24, 2015).

684

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 52

III. IDAHO’S CRUMBLING INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM
Currently, 30 states have relieved counties of the burden of funding
indigent-defense counsel, but not every state chooses to adopt a stateoperated indigent defense delivery system.119 In fact, Idaho has not relieved its local government of indigent defense responsibilities.120 Instead, Idaho continues to delegate the responsibility of indigent defense
to its counties.121 But, as in other states that have delegated indigent
defense responsibilities to local government, Idaho’s local governmentbased systems are inherently flawed and structurally unsound.122
When counties (or local governments) fund indigent defense, there
are inevitable inequities from county-to-county.123 Inescapably, urban
counties will have more cases than rural counties, which overburdens
attorneys and strains resources.124 Additionally, rural counties are left
with fewer resources and can be financially crippled by even a single
murder case, or––as is the case in some rural Idaho counties––the county often has a fewer number of attorneys so they can quickly become
overburdened if the caseload increases just slightly.125 Idaho’s system
suffers from these types of defects and indigent defendants suffer the
consequences of the crumbling system.
A. How the Current Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho Are Working
Idaho’s current indigent defense system is codified in the Idaho
Code as the Idaho Public Defense Act.126 Other than appellate indigent
defense––which is an Executive Branch agency and operated at the
state level––Idaho’s indigent defense obligation is delegated to each individual county.127 Even though there are three traditional ways to delivery indigent defense,128 the Idaho legislature chose not to codify the
assigned counsel system.129 Additionally, the Idaho Legislature created
an extra approach under both the dedicated public defender office model
and the contract system resulting in four methods available to Idaho
counties.
By statute, each county can implement one of four systems for
providing indigent defense services.130 Counties can choose from one of
these four approved methods: (1) a county can establish and maintain a
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

NLADA, supra note 7, at 2.
See id. at 2–3.
See id.
See Justice Denied, supra note 72, at 55.
Id.
Id.
See Justice Denied, supra note 72, at 55.
IDAHO CODE §§ 19-848–866 (2014).
Idaho Project Page, supra note 12.
See supra Part II.B.
IDAHO CODE § 19-859(1)–(4) (2014).
Id.
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dedicated public defender office, (2) a county can jointly establish and
operate a dedicated public defender office, (3) a county can contract with
another county’s office for services, or (4) a county can contract with a
private attorney.131
Seven Idaho counties have decided to implement the first option in
Idaho–– establish and maintain a dedicated public defender office.132
Currently, there are two counties in Idaho that have opted for the second choice and have entered into an agreement with a neighboring
county to establish a joint public defender’s office.133 But no counties in
Idaho have implemented the third delivery option; thus, no county contracts with an outside public defender office.134 And last, thirty-four
counties in Idaho have chosen the fourth option and currently contract
with private attorneys for the delivery of indigent defense services.135
Despite the four statutory systems available to Idaho counties,
some counties chose not to implement any of the available methods and
chose to create their own delivery system.136 This “we do what we want”
approach creates a chaotic patchwork of implemented systems in Idaho.
In 2010, the Defender Association––which frequently evaluates indigent defense delivery systems throughout the country––produced its
evaluation of indigent defense systems in Idaho.137 The evaluation’s results were grim.138 No counties evaluated in Idaho had indigent defense
delivery systems that were constitutionally adequate.139 More specifically, the Defender Association concluded “the state of Idaho fails to provide the level of representation required by our Constitution for those
who cannot afford counsel in its criminal and juvenile courts.”140 Thus,
indigent defendants suffer because of Idaho’s constitutionally inadequate systems.
131. Id.
132. Ian H. Thomson, Report to the Legislature, IDAHO STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE
COMM’N, 5 (2015) (on file with author); Complaint, supra note 6, at 18.
133. Thomson, supra note 132, at 6.
134. See generally id.
135. Id. at 6.
136. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 18.
137. See generally NLADA, supra note 7; NLADA Publications & Reports, NAT’L
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, http://nlada.net/publications-reports (last visited Feb. 9,
2016).
138. Idaho
Report,
NAT’L
LEGAL
AID
&
DEFENDER
ASS’N,
http://www.nlada100years.org/node/5245 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
139. Id.
140. NLADA, supra note 7, at 2. Much of the information used in this article is based
on the Defender Association’s study conducted in 2010. Consequently, the information is out
of date, but it is the best data available in Idaho with little exception. Additionally, the report
only covers a sampling of Idaho’s forty-four counties. When available, this article will provide
updated information and will supplement with county information not included in the Defender Association’s report.
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1. Counties with Dedicated Public Defender Offices
Today, Idaho has seven counties that have dedicated public defender offices.141 These offices employ 115 full time public defenders and another forty-one conflict defenders.142
In Bonneville County, at the time of the report, indigent defense
services were provided through a small public defender office that
housed five attorneys including the chief public defender.143 All conflict
cases were contracted to an attorney who, in turn, subcontracted cases
to two additional attorneys.144 The County commissioners selected all
the public defenders and the conflict attorney; and the commissioners
determined the amount of funding that should be allocated to indigent
defense, including payment to the conflict attorney.145
Additionally, the Bonneville public defenders were allowed to have
private practices in addition to their indigent defense duties.146 With one
of the five attorneys handling 1,154 misdemeanors at the time of the
evaluation––nearly three times the national recommended amount––it
is likely that a single private practice case will significantly interfere
with a defender’s indigent defense duties because there will be less time
available for the attorney’s indigent defense clients.147 Or there will be
an incentive for the attorney to spend more time on cases where he is
paid a higher hourly rate.148
Bonneville County public defenders were well aware of the impact
their extremely high caseloads had on the quality of representation.149
The single attorney handling all misdemeanor cases estimated that he
was only able to spend about one hour on each case.150 Additionally,
there were three district judges in Bonneville County, and the attorneys
from the public defender’s office were assigned to argue all of their cases
in front of one particular judge.151

141. Thomson, supra note 132, at 5. These counties include: Ada, Bannock, Bonner,
Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, and Twin Falls. Id.
142. Id. at 6.
143. NLADA, supra note 7, at 19. In 2014, Bonneville County created a separate Office of the Conflict Public Defender. This office employs two attorneys who handle conflict
cases. Thomson, supra note 132, at 5 n.3.
144. NLADA, supra note 7 at 19, 22. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 1.7, states “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” Defined conflicts of interest include: the representation of one client
will be directly adverse to another client or representation of one or more clients will limit
the lawyer’s obligations to another client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.7(a) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1983).
145. NLADA, supra note 7, at 19.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 20.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 19.
151. NLADA, supra note 7, at 21.
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This system presented many risks, including harm to the client.152
For example, the attorney may have a desire to keep the judge happy by
keeping dockets moving and this will lead to focusing on the judge’s
preferences rather than advocating for the client and the client’s
needs.153 Overall, the Bonneville County public defender’s office lacked
the necessary resources to provide adequate representation to its indigent clients, thus, chilling the right to counsel.154
In Ada County, on the other hand, the chief public defender had
been in his position for over twenty-three years and was applauded for
his dedication to his staff and continuing independence in operation.155
However, despite the chief defender’s leadership, the overall office workloads were too large to be manageable.156 For example, in 2007, the office’s felony caseload reached 2,750 cases.157 At that time, there were
twelve felony attorneys meaning that each felony attorney averaged just
over 229 cases per attorney.158 And the misdemeanor attorneys were
even more overwhelmed than the felony attorneys taking on a staggering 700–800 cases per year, nearly double the national standard for
misdemeanor attorneys.159
Kootenai County had the most client-centered approach to indigent
defense representation out of all the counties visited.160 In Kootenai
County, the County commissioners directly appoint the chief public defender and, at the time of the investigation, the current chief public defender had been in office since the late 1980s.161 The chief public defender was proud of his attorney’s zealous representation of criminal defendants and the office’s litigious nature.162 However, because of this
stance, it was well known that the public defender’s office and the prosecutor’s office had a contentious relationship.163 The office had adequate
152. See id. at 19.
153. Id. at 21.
154. Id. at 20, 22.
155. Id. at 26.
156. Id. at 27.
157. NLADA, supra note 7, at 27.
158. See id. at 28. Two hundred and twenty-nine or more cases per year meant that
each attorney was able to spend about two hours on each case no matter the case’s seriousness. Id.
159. See id. A recent analysis revealed that at least six counties in Idaho have public
defenders that are handling more than double the amount of work any one attorney should
take on. Complaint, supra note 6, at 10. And, “[b]ased on recent court observations, public
defenders in Kootenai, Nez Perce, Payette, Bannock, and Bonnevile counties, among others,
have so many cases assigned to them that they are unable to even identify their clients until
minutes before the defendants’ court appearances.” Complaint, supra note 6, at 39.
160. NLADA, supra note 7, at 35.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 35.
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support staff and was well managed, but the caseloads of each individual attorney were well above the national standards as they are in most
counties throughout Idaho.164 For example, one attorney in Kootenai
County handled 155 felony cases, which is right at the maximum recommended number of cases for a felony attorney, but the same attorney
also handled 63 misdemeanor cases, a juvenile delinquency case, and
five civil commitment cases.165
Public defenders in Kootenai County also faced egregious infrastructure problems within the court system, which undoubtedly had a
negative impact on their clients.166 The building that housed the holding
cells where in-custody defendants would be held while awaiting hearings or trials had been condemned.167 When public defender’s had to
bring clients to the courthouse, the defendants were held in a van in a
yard outside the courthouse sometimes for hours at a time and with only
portable lavatories available.168 To make matters worse, two jury deliberation rooms had windows that overlooked this lot and, if they wanted
to, jurors could look out and see defendants shackled and in jail uniforms.169 These types of deficiencies negatively impact indigent defendants because it is hard to get a fair trial if jurors are allowed to see you
shackled and confined––it creates an unnecessary prejudice against the
defendant.170
Idaho counties that use a dedicated public defender office are significantly out-numbered by counties that use other forms of indigent
defense delivery services. The system most often implemented by Idaho
counties is the contract system.
2. Counties with the Contract System
Currently, thirty-four counties in Idaho have opted for the contract
system and have contracted with private attorneys for the delivery of
indigent defense services.171 At the time of the Defender Association report, Nez Perce County used flat-fee contracts for its indigent defense
services.172 One law firm in Nez Perce County carried the contract and
164. Id. at 37.
165. NLADA, supra note 7, at 37. Further, as recently as 2014, “four of the office’s
[fifteen] attorneys handled well over 40 cases each, the bulk of which were felonies and misdemeanors. Another four defenders handled over 300 cases . . . including a mixture of felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and other proceedings . . . . Such caseloads are well above
national standards and impossible for one person to handle effectively.” Complaint, supra
note 6, at 11.
166. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 37.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Thomson, supra note 132, at 6. A more recent survey indicated that at least
nineteen counties in Idaho continue to use a flat-fee contract system despite recent legislation that abolished the practice. Complaint, supra note 6 at 10.
172. NLADA, supra note 7, at 10.
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had the responsibility of selecting and paying conflict attorneys.173 There
were no caseload standards in effect in the County and the law firm decided how many attorneys to employ in order to provide defender services without any government oversight.174 The firm also decided how
many employees—including staff and administrators—to hire and how
much to pay them.175 The only limitation the County imposed on the law
firm is that it must have dedicated “a majority” of its time to indigent
defense clients.176
Fortunately, the County restricted the law firm from handling private cases inside of Nez Perce County. However, the County did not require the law firm to report how many private cases it handled outside
of the County, and it was completely up to the firm to decide if a case
was conflicted.177 There were no oversight procedures in place so the
County had no way to determine the overall quality of service it received
for the contract price it paid to the law firm.178 Though the contract price
of $440,000 seems high for a law firm with two partners handling all the
County’s indigent defense services, the firm paid their one associate’s
salary, expenses, and overhead with that amount.179 Thus, each attorney
in the firm earned just above $61,000 per year for indigent defense representation and that figure is reduced further by the cost of actual representation such as experts, long-distance calls, investigations, and copies.180
Even more troubling is that not only were the firm’s attorneys responsible for all standard felony, misdemeanor, and juvenile cases, they
were also responsible for manning the County’s many problem solving
courts such as drug court, mental health court, family reunification
court, and DUI court.181 The associate attorney single-handedly staffed
both the mental health court and the DUI court.182 It is estimated that
the associate attorney handled over 1,100 cases in 2008.183 Of those cases, approximately 900, were misdemeanor cases.184 The national standard for a single attorney is no more than 400 misdemeanor cases per

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 10.
Id. at 11–13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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year meaning that the associate handled the recommended workload of
nearly three attorneys.185
Additionally, Canyon County utilized a flat-fee contract with a private law firm to provide all the County’s indigent defense services.186
The annual contract price was $1,496,950 and the firm had total control
over how to spend the money including how many attorneys it needed to
employ to fulfill its contracted services.187 Also, the firm had to pay the
sub-contracted conflict attorneys out of the contract price.188 Because the
firm had to pay its conflict attorneys out of its own fee, there was a significant incentive for the firm to misidentify conflicts in order to retain
more of the contract price.189
Also, an incentive existed to cut corners when it came to investigations.190 If an attorney working under the contract is unable to conduct
his or her own investigation, the firm’s partners had to approve a request to hire an investigator.191 Since the compensation for the investigator comes out of the contract price, there was an incentive for the
partners to deny the request.192 The law firm also had no workload controls for the amount of cases assigned to each individual attorney, thus
several attorneys had caseloads double or triple the national standards.193
In Power County, indigent defense services were contracted out to
three individual attorneys.194 The system consisted of one primary contract attorney, one conflict attorney, and one overflow attorney (not on a
contract with the County).195 The previously elected prosecutor became a
magistrate judge and had relationships with the criminal defense attorneys in the area.196 Because of these relationships, the County commissioners sought the judge’s recommendations when it decided which defense attorney should be awarded the indigent defense contract.197 Thus,
the defender system in Power County is subject to political and judicial
influence because the defense attorneys had an incentive to keep the

185. NLADA, supra note 7, at 16–17.
186. Id. at 23. Canyon County now operates a dedicated public defender’s office. It
began operation on October 1, 2014. Tera A. Harden, Public Defender, CANYON COUNTY
IDAHO, http://www.canyonco.org/PublicDefender (last visited March 8, 2015).
187. NLADA, supra note 7, at 23.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 25.
190. See id. at 19.
191. Id. at 23, 25.
192. See id. at 19.
193. NLADA, supra note 7, at 24–25. After the Defender Association’s evaluation,
the firm that held the contract walked away and settled a lawsuit it had filed against Canyon County after the county terminated its contract before its contracted end date. Id. at 24.
194. Id. at 30.
195. Id. at 30–31.
196. Id. at 30.
197. Id.
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judge and commissioners happy instead of focusing on client representation.198
The conflict defender was paid $16,800 per year and could take up
to eight cases per month.199 So, if the conflict defender took on the maximum number of cases, he would be paid $175 per case no matter how
serious the case,200 and that number is extremely low. The attorneys,
and conflict attorneys, were also allowed to maintain a private practice.201 Additionally, there were no caseload limits and no caseload monitoring in Power County.202
In addition to dedicated public defender offices and contract-based
systems, judicial-assigned counsel is an indigent defense delivery option
available to states and counties; however, Idaho’s legislature chose not
to codify a judicial-assigned counsel system.203 And some Idaho counties
use unique delivery systems not even available by statute.204
3. Counties Using Other Systems
Currently, there are two counties in Idaho that have opted to enter
into agreements with neighboring counties to establish a joint public
defender’s office.205 This joint office employs five full-time public defenders and operates a small office in each of the two counties.206 This system is unique because two counties pool their resources in order to provide indigent defense services.207 This joint public defender office system
is statutorily acceptable under the Idaho Public Defense Act’s section
two, but several counties throughout Idaho choose to operate under a
system that is not defined in the Idaho Code.208
For example, Washington County currently does not use any of the
four systems identified by statute.209 Washington County has seven attorneys who are appointed by a judge on an as needed basis.210 Even
though a judicial appointment delivery system is one that some states
and counties can choose to implement, it is not allowed in Idaho.211 The
198. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 29.
199. Id. at 31.
200. Id. at 31 n.93.
201. Id. at 32.
202. Id.
203. See generally id.
204. See generally NLADA, supra note 7.
205. Thomson, supra note 132, at 6. The counties that have entered into an agreement to establish a joint public defender’s office are Cassia and Minidoka. Id.
206. Id.
207. See generally id.
208. IDAHO CODE § 19-859(1)–(4) (2014).
209. Thomson, supra note 132, at 7; IDAHO CODE § 19-859(1)–(4).
210. Thomson, supra note 132, at 7.
211. IDAHO CODE § 19-859(1)–(4).
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Idaho legislature, in drafting the statute, did not include a judicially
appointed counsel delivery system as an option for Idaho counties.212
This effectively means that Washington County is violating the statute.213
According to the Defender Association’s report, Blaine County had
one of the most unique systems of all the counties in Idaho.214 The County operated by awarding contracts to a set of private law firms, each one
on a contract that rotated monthly.215 The County had contracted with
five private law firms, and four sole practitioners.216 The attorneys decided amongst themselves which months they would take throughout
that year.217 This structure meant that all indigent defense cases that
came through the County during a particular month would be assigned
to that particular attorney or firm regardless of the attorney’s skill level
or the case’s complexity.218
In Blaine County, when a conflict arose, the case would be assigned
to the “on call” attorney for the next month.219 The contract attorneys
were allowed to maintain a private practice.220 In one particular firm,
the average fee for indigent defense work was fifty dollars per hour
whereas attorneys could charge up to $250 per hour to their private clients.221 This discrepancy alone incentivizes attorneys to spend more
time on, and more zealously advocate for, private clients than public
defense clients.222
If the patchwork of County implemented systems seems chaotic,
that’s because it is. And that is part of the problem. Many of the systems
Idaho counties choose to implement are flawed in one way or another.
These flaws include violations ranging from failing to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial to operating a system not defined by statute.
But one thing is for sure: most Idaho indigent defense delivery systems
result in violations of the ABA principles and are not meeting constitutional minimums.
B. Idaho’s Violations of the ABA Principles
Many counties in Idaho are failing to meet constitutional minimums for indigent defense and are violating the ABA’s principles for
indigent defense delivery.223 Each county examined by the Defender’s
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
See id.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 33.
Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 34.
Id.
Id.
See generally id. at 52.
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Association had multiple principle violations, which suggests that Idaho’s defendants are not provided the foundational defense representation they are entitled to by the Constitution.224 Though Idaho’s systems
violate all ten ABA principles in one way or another, the most egregious
violations were abuses of principles 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10.
1. Violations of ABA Principle 3
The ABA’s principle 3 requires public defender systems to provide
counsel to indigent defendants as soon as possible after arrest, detention, or request.225 This should occur within twenty-four hours.226 Early
appointment of counsel ensures that the right to counsel at all critical
stages of the prosecutorial process remains intact.227 Several counties in
Idaho violated principle 3.228
For example, in Bonneville County, a public defender was not present in the courtroom as indigent defendants were meeting with a prosecutor attempting to negotiate a plea deal.229 And no one in Bonneville
County checked for probable cause for the initial arrests.230 Even long
after the initial arrest, judges and public defenders were not present
while prosecutors were striking plea deals with defendants.231
Additionally, in Kootenai County, public defenders were not present at first appearances.232 In one particular instance, a prosecutor
stood before a group of defendants prior to an arraignment hearing with
no judge or public defender present.233 The attorney said she would show
a video explaining the defendant’s rights after they had met with the
prosecutor and said that if the defendants wanted to speak with an attorney, they should hire one.234 The attorney did not mention the right
to counsel if the defendants could not afford one.235 When one defendant
asked if the plea deal the prosecutor offered him would disappear if he
asked to talk to a lawyer, the prosecutor simply said she could not advise the defendant.236 This sequence happened in front of the other de-

224. See generally id.
225. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2.
226. Id.
227. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 514 (1966).
228. NLADA, supra note 7, at 56.
229. Id. at 54–55.
230. Id. at 56.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 52. In fact, only five Idaho counties provide counsel to indigent defendants
at first appearances, in violation of Idaho’s laws. Complaint, supra note 6, at 20.
233. NLADA, supra note 7, at 54.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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fendants making it likely that they too would be fearful of losing a decent plea deal if they asked for counsel.237
Similarly, in Nez Perce County, arraignments did not happen in
the courtroom.238 Arraignments happened in front of the Clerk’s window
where the defendant signed a waiver of rights form.239 A sign near the
Clerk’s window read “[i]f you apply for a Public Defender and the service
is granted to you IT IS NOT FREE! You may be required to reimburse
Nez Perce County.”240 The defendant then waited to meet with the prosecutor to negotiate a plea agreement without ever having a public defender present to ensure the defendant’s rights are protected.241 By not
requiring defense counsel present at arraignments, Nez Perce County
violated the ABA’s principle 3.
2. Violations of ABA Principle 4 and ABA Principle 7
Many counties in Idaho did not have private meeting spaces at the
courthouses or in the jails where attorneys could meet confidentially
with their clients, which is a violation of principle 4.242 Private meeting
spaces where attorneys and defendants can openly discuss the defendants’ case are extremely important to preserving the defendant’s right to
present a defense.243 Idaho counties violated defendants’ constitutional
rights by making it difficult for these types of meetings to occur.244
Additionally, many featured counties were in violation of the ABA’s
principle 7, the requirement for vertical representation.245 Several counties in Idaho engage in horizontal representation.246 Horizontal representation occurs when one attorney handles each separate part of a client’s case like an assembly line; one attorney handles all arraignments,
one attorney handles all trials, and so on.247 This horizontal representation system was used in Ada County and other public defender offices
throughout Idaho meaning that indigent defendant’s in those counties
are not benefitting from the continuity of communicating with one attorney throughout the entire process.248

237.
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239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
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247.
248.

Id.
Id. at 52.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 52.
Id. See updated information in note 4, supra, and Appendix A.
Id.
Id. at 58, 62–66.
See id.
See id.
Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
Id.; see NLADA, supra note 7, at 57.
NLADA, supra note 7, at 57.
Id. at 58.
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3. Violations of ABA Principle 6 and ABA Principle 9
The ABA’s principles 6 and 9 are linked.249 Principle 6 requires that
an attorney’s experience, training, and ability be matched with the
case’s complexity.250 And principle 9 requires that public defenders attend continuing legal education, thus, enhancing the training and ability required by principle 6.251 Counties in Idaho are violating these two
principles.
For example, while Ada County was commendable on its system of
dividing public defenders and staff into teams based on experience, its
lack of training available was a problem because in-house training was
“virtually non-existent.”252 The same was true in Power County. The
County imposed no training requirements on its contract defenders and
offered no reimbursement for training.253 Thus, the contract defenders
simply met the minimum requirements imposed on them by the state
bar association and many chose the least expensive classes, which they
paid for out of their own pockets.254 These principle violations hurt indigent defendants who need trained, experienced, and qualified attorneys
to represent them.
4. Violations of ABA Principle 10
Lastly, many Idaho counties failed to meet the ABA’s principle 10
requirements.255 Principle 10 requires that all defense attorneys are
“supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency” and
many Idaho counties failed to supervise and review indigent defense
attorneys for effectiveness.256
For example, while the Kootenai County office was large enough to
require mid-level supervising attorneys, the evaluation and review of
attorneys was informal and inadequate as none of the attorneys were
evaluated annually.257 The same lack of supervision and evaluation
standards were reported in Bonneville County, Blaine County, and Nez
Perce County.258 For instance, Bonneville County had no policies on min249. See id. at 67.
250. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
251. Id.
252. NLADA, supra note 7, at 68. The Idaho State Public Defense Commission recently conducted a state-wide assessment and discovered that most indigent defense attorneys throughout Idaho do not receive adequate training relevant to representing indigent
defendants. Complaint, supra note 6, at 11.
253. NLADA, supra note 7, at 69.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 69–73.
256. Id.; Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
257. NLADA, supra note 7, at 70.
258. Id. at 70–73.
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imum attorney qualifications and even one felony attorney said no one
helped him on his first trial, nor did anyone supervise him in court.259
These violations mean that Idaho defense attorneys are allowed to grow
complacent or are unknowingly making errors that no one is correcting.
Therefore, Idaho defendants may not be getting the representation they
desperately need.
Even with the understanding of the egregious principle violations
just described, because of Idaho’s unique differences from county-tocounty, there is no single best “cookie-cutter” public defense delivery
system according to the Defender Association.260
However, “there are two primary factors that determine the adequacy of indigent defense services provided: (a) the degree and sufficiency of state funding and structure, and (b) compliance with nationally
recognized standards of justice. So long as these two goals are met, Idaho policy-makers will have remedied the crisis.”261
The Defender Association hoped its report would force legislators to
take a closer look at the present system and see its constitutional inadequacies and that change would come before a class action lawsuit.262
However so far, even with the two new legislative “patches,” none of the
changes have proven to be enough to push Idaho in the right direction.
C. A Cosmetic Patch: A Critical Examination of Idaho’s Recent
Legislative Attempt at Structural Repair
Recently, Idaho Legislators seem to be listening to the demands of
indigent defense providers and passed legislation aimed at initiating
reform, but it is not enough.263 For instance, the House of Representatives passed resolutions creating a committee to determine the best way
to implement state oversight of indigent defense.264 The resolutions also
acknowledged that Idaho’s delivery of right to counsel services lacked
uniformity in caseload requirements, in appointment of counsel practices, and in training.265 The Committee studied two different statemanaged indigent defense delivery models: (1) a county operated system––similar to the current system where counties can choose their de259. Id. at 71.
260. Id. at 89.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 19-849, 850 (2014); H.R. Con. Res. 26, 62nd Leg. 1st
Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013); see also Complaint, supra note 6, at 17.
264. Carroll, supra note 9; Public Defense Interim Committee – HCR 40, IDAHO
LEGISLATURE, http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/defense.htm (last visited
Mar. 8, 2016) [Hereinafter HCR 40]. These Resolutions are HCR 026, representing the 2013
Committee, and HCR 040, representing the 2014 Committee. In January, 2016, Idaho’s Governor set aside $5 million in his proposed 2016-2017 budget for the Committee’s recommendations. Nathan Brown, Lawmakers Discuss Fixing Public Defense, MAGICVALLEY.COM (Jan.
14,
2016),
http://magicvalley.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/lawmakers-discuss-fixingpublic-defense/article_572ab574-b17b-5457-808b-ccc86a768e97.html.
265. Carroll, supra note 9.
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livery method––but with a state-oversight commission that promulgates
rules and enforces standards, and (2) a state-financed and managed system where all counties would be required to maintain a dedicated public
defender office.266
Most recently, the Committee voted against a resolution that would
have placed the responsibility on the State to assign public defenders
finding that county officials have the local expertise to deal with these
types of issues––at least according to one committee member.267 This
meant that individual counties were still responsible for indigent defense.268
During one of the Committee’s meetings, the Idaho Supreme
Court’s Chief Justice stated that he supported the key areas of study
including: “[t]he structure and organization of how Idaho will deliver its
system of public defense; [h]ow the system will be held accountable;
[t]he standards and funding for training; and [h]ow best to provide ongoing and stable funding to support Idaho’s system of indigent defense.”269 The Chief Justice asked the Committee to look at specific problems throughout Idaho including workload standards, training for attorneys, and recruitment of qualified, experienced attorneys. He also
asked the Committee to recommend to the legislature that flat-fee contracts be eradicated.270
The Chief Justice’s comments are unique. It is a rare situation for a
potential litigant or lawyer to receive insight on how a judge would rule
on a particular issue. The Committee received that gift in the Chief Justice’s comments. A Justice on a Supreme Court is the final arbiter of
these types of issues and if he is recognizing the problem, it means there
is a problem. If Idaho doesn’t soon fix its problems, it could end up on
the wrong side of a final decision.
In March 2014, the governor of Idaho signed House Bill 542 into
law.271 The law (1) prohibited the use of flat-fee contracts by Idaho’s
266. Id. The committee held seven meetings during 2014. HCR 40, supra note 264.
267. HCR 40, supra note 264; Kimberlee Kruesi, Legislative Panel Kills Public Defender
Resolution,
IDAHO
PRESS-TRIBUNE,
Nov.
24,
2014,
http://www.idahopress.com/news/local/legislative-panel-kills-public-defenderresolution/article_4fa73da2-7438-11e4-8c8e-bba37c2515b2.html [hereinafter IDAHO PRESSTRIBUNE].
268. HCR 40, supra note 264; IDAHO PRESS-TRIBUNE, supra note 267.
269. The State of Idaho Supreme Court, Remarks by Chief Justice Roger Burdick to
Public
Defender
Interim
Committee,
1
(Aug.
15,
2013),
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2013/interim/defense0815_burdick.pdf
[hereinafter
Remarks].
270. Jon Mosher, Idaho Chief Justice Calls for the Eradication of Flat-fee Contracts,
SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER, Aug. 16, 2013, http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-chief-justicecalls-for-the-eradication-of-flat-fee-contracts/.
271. Carroll, supra note 9.
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counties, and (2) created the Idaho Public Defense Commission.272 While
these legislative measures appear to be a step in the right direction for
Idaho, they equate to a shiny new coat of paint on Idaho’s public defense
system.273 But this cosmetic touch-up does not repair the underlying
problem––Idaho’s crumbling indigent defense foundation.
1. Abolishment of Flat-Fee Contracts
Flat-fee contracts are prohibited under the ABA’s principle 8.274
The use of flat-fee contracts is problematic because the contracts encourage governments to contract with the lowest bidder of indigent defense services.275 There are also implicit incentives for attorneys to do
less.276 For example, attorneys on flat-fee contracts get paid one flat rate
for an unlimited number of cases and are not reimbursed for litigationrelated expenses.277 Thus, the more work an attorney does on a case, the
less he gets paid, so there are financial motivations to spend less time
with each client than if an attorney was being paid by the hour.278
In 2014, the Idaho Legislature banned the use of flat-fee contracts
for indigent defense services.279 The result was that counties could contract with a defense attorney for indigent defense services as long as the
county abided by the following provision: “the terms of the contract shall
not include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee
for the services and expenses of the attorney.”280 This provision allows
counties to continue to provide indigent defense services through contract attorneys as long as the county is not paying the flat-fee contract
attorneys one flat rate, which includes the attorney’s expenses.281
At first glance, this legislation makes it seem like the Idaho Legislature is being proactive about providing indigent defendants with a
greater level of Sixth Amendment protections.282 However, the statute
may be flawed in the way it was written, allowing counties to find a
loophole that allows them to continue providing flat-fee services,283
272. Id.
273. “Idaho has become the epitome of an indigent-defense system in crisis, notwithstanding the 2014 amendments to the public-defense statutes, which have done very little to
address the underlying causes of the State’s indigent-defense problem.” Complaint, supra
note 6, at 14.
274. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3.
275. Mosher, supra note 270.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See IDAHO CODE § 19-859(4) (2012).
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. See IDAHO CODE § 19-859 (2012).
283. See Ian H. Thomson, Executive Director, State Public Defense Commission,
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/interim/pdef1124_thomson.pdf
(last
visited
March 8, 2016) [hereinafter Executive Director]. As of publication, Ian Thomson is no longer
the Executive Director of the Idaho Public Defense Commission.
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which are popular with flat-fee attorneys.284 The statute uses the word
and: “single fixed fee for the services and expenses.”285 The word “and” is
a conjunctive connector meaning that it links two words or clauses and
gives the clauses equal weight in the sentence.286 Thus, it appears from
the statute’s plain meaning that the drafters meant to abolish only
those contracts that are inclusive of both the attorney’s fee for services
and the attorney’s expenses.287 A contract price that excludes expenses
may not be in violation of the statute.288
Counties are taking advantage of the statute’s loophole.289 Counties
have interpreted the statute to mean that if a county agrees to pay an
attorney a flat-fee but then pays for her expenses separately, it is not in
violation of the statute.290 At least for the time being, it will be difficult
to determine if counties are actually following the statute, but it appears
that these types of contracts are still being used in counties throughout
Idaho.291 Moreover, it is not hard to imagine that once counties following
the statute discover that its neighboring counties are using this loophole, they may choose to return to their bad behavior and abandon the
progress they have made.292 There appears to be major problems with
the way the legislation was drafted, causing the statute to do little for
indigent defense services in Idaho.
2. Idaho Public Defense Commission
The creation of the Public Defense Commission (Commission) also
does little to improve indigent defense services in Idaho as it violates
principle 1. The Commission is responsible for and has the authority to
provide training, to implement performance standards, and to set up a
system for data collection.293 However, just creating the Commission
284. Stephen Henderson, New Contract for County’s Public Defender, TETON VALLEY
NEWS (June 17, 2014 6:01 PM), http://www.tetonvalleynews.net/news/new-contract-forcounty-s-public-defender/article_052a656a-f684-11e3-8278-001a4bcf887a.html.
285. IDAHO CODE § 19-859(4) (2012) (emphasis added).
286. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 827 (3d.
ed. 2001).
287. IDAHO CODE § 73-113(1) (2004) (stating “[t]he literal words of a statute are the
best guide to determining legislative intent).
288. See generally Executive Director, supra note 283.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. Carroll, supra note 9. “The [Commission] is further responsible for making recommendations to the Idaho legislature, including an initial round of recommendations that
was due by January 20, 2015, regarding a number of issues, including core requirements for
indigent-defense contracts, qualifications and experience standards for defending attorneys
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does not mean that Idaho’s indigent defense problems disappear.294 The
Commission’s powers and functionalities are flawed in three ways: (1)
the Commission is not independent from judicial and political influence,
(2) while the Commission has the power to create rules about the collection of data, it has no power to actually collect the data, and (3) the
Commission has no power to enforce the rules and standards it creates.295
[and] enforcement mechanisms . . . ” Complaint, supra note 6, at 19. However, as of June 17,
2015, the Commission had not yet done so. Id.
In January 2016, the Public Defense Reform Interim Committee signed off on a
“draft bill that would give the Public Defense Commission the power to set public defense
standards, provide training[,] and give out grant money to counties to help them comply.”
Nathan Brown, Public Defense Commission Signs Off on Draft Bill, MAGICVALLEY.COM (Feb.
9,
2016),
http://magicvalley.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/public-defense-commissionsigns-off-on-draft-bill/article_76166c29-5d21-5c58-8e4d-22a03a1c63f9.html. However, regarding the Commission’s enforcement capabilities, the draft bill proposes that the Commisison first try to mediate if a county is not following the Commission’s standards. Id. And
only when mediation fails will the State step in and pay to fix the problem—a cost that will
eventually have to be repaid by the county. Id. Additionally, regarding funding, the committee is recomending that $5.5 million go to providing grants to counties and paying the Commission’s employees. Id. But even before the Commission’s employees are paid, the grant
money only leaves an average of $125,000 per county to supplement the current indigent
defense deficiences. Five and a half million dollars is simply not enough to fix Idaho’s indigent defense problems.
As an update, “[o]n March 22, 2016, a $5.4 million appropriations bill was
passed authorizing the [Idaho State Public Defense Commission], in part, to disseminate
$4,266,500 in grants to counties to offset the cost of compliance with indigent defense standards. This bill passed both chambers unanimously . . . . Another $550,000 was appropriated
to encourage counties to merge trial-level services into regional systems, and $250,000 is
available to assist counties with extraordinary litigation costs. The balance of $416,300 funds
an expansion of [Commission] staff and associated overhead costs. David Carroll, Idaho Empowers State Commission with New Authorities and New Funding, SIXTH AMENDMENT
CENTER (Mar. 23, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-empowers-state-commission-withnew-authorities-and-new-funding/.
294. Carroll, supra note 9. The Public Defense Reform Interim Committee proposed
the legislation that created the Commission and the Committee’s concern was that it would
take at least a year for the commission to be up and running. Here is the good news: the
Commission has been established and has started to make recommendations to the Legislature.
295. See IDAHO CODE § 19-849–850(1)(a) (2012). According to Idaho Code §19-849:
(1) There is hereby created in the department of self-governing agencies the state
public defense commission. The commission shall consist of seven (7) members
as follows:
(a) Two (2) representatives from the state legislature that shall include one (1)
member from the senate and one (1) member from the house of representatives;
(b) One (1) representative appointed by the chief justice of the Idaho supreme
court; and
(c) Four (4) representatives appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate as follows:
(i) One (1) representative from the Idaho association of counties;
(ii) One (1) representative who has experience as a defending attorney;
(iii) One (1) representative from the office of the state appellate public defender;
and
(iv) One (1) representative from the Idaho juvenile justice commission. . . .
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Pursuant to the statute’s language, the Commission’s first flaw is
that it violates principle 1.296 A successful oversight commission needs to
be able to assure quality indigent defense representation throughout the
state and must be independent from political and judicial influence.297 In
Idaho, the Commission includes seven members.298 Two members are
appointed by the Legislature (one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate) and it is likely that these appointments have
political affiliations.299 Additionally, Idaho Supreme Court’s Chief Justice appoints one of the seven Commission members.300 And the Governor, who has a political affiliation, appoints four of the Commission’s
seven members.301 These appointments are likely to be influenced by
strong party affiliations.302 It is also likely that the appointments are
heavily influence by people with robust connections to power and politics. Therefore, the Legislature violated the first principle’s requirement
that public defense systems be free from political influence or judicial
oversight when it created the Commission.303
Consequently, the Commission, serving as overseer of the public
defense function in Idaho, is not independent from political influence
and judicial oversight. And because appointments come from all three
branches of government, it appears the statute was designed so that the
Commission is accountable to not a single branch of government but
then all of them at the same time.304 This set up causes two problems.
First, if the Commission is not accountable to a single branch of government, then the Commission may choose to implement indigent de-

According to Idaho Code § 19-850:
(1) The state public defense commission shall:
(a) Promulgate rules in accordance with the provisions of chapter 52, title 67,
Idaho Code, establishing the following:
(i) Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending attorneys, which shall promote competency and consistency in case types including,
but not limited to, criminal, juvenile, abuse and neglect, post-conviction, civil
commitment, capital and civil contempt; and
(ii) Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports submitted pursuant to section 19-864, Idaho Code. The data reported shall include caseload,
workload and expenditures. . . .
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See supra Part II.B.4.
Justice Denied, supra note 72, at 148.
IDAHO CODE § 19-849(1)(a) & (b) (2012).
See IDAHO CODE § 19-849(1)(a) & (b) (2012).
IDAHO CODE § 19-849(1)(a) & (b) (2012).
IDAHO CODE § 19-849(1)(c) (2012).
See IDAHO CODE § 19-849(1)(c) (2012).
See H.R. 62-542, 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014).
IDAHO CODE § 19-849(1) (2012).
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fense changes not endorsed by any governmental branch. Second, if the
Commission is accountable to all three branches of government at the
same time, this likely will result in political gridlock where the Commission will be stalled from advancing any meaningful change. Accordingly,
when the Legislature drafted the statute creating the Commission, it
did not heed political independence recommendations.305
Second, the Commission is flawed because its power is empty.306
The Commission’s only two objectives are to promulgate rules for training and legal education for public defenders and to create rules for uniform data reporting requirements annual reports.307 But––despite the
power to create rules for data reporting––the Commission has no power
to collect the data.308
Promulgating rules for data collection is a nice start for indigent
defense reform in Idaho.309 But until the Legislature gives the Commission the power and budget to collect the data, the Commission will have
a hard time collecting the data it needs to convince the Legislature that
drastic changes are needed in Idaho’s indigent defense delivery system.310
Even if the Commission had the power to collect meaningful data,
the Commission doesn’t have enough money.311 The Commission’s working budget is approximately $100,000.312 These resources are not enough
for the Commission to even begin the process of collecting critical data
on Idaho’s indigent defense––assuming the Legislature gave the Commission any power to do anything besides promulgate rules. The ability
to collect and analyze data is the most important and fundamental role
of a commission such as this one.313 Collecting essential data is only the
first step in a long line of steps towards indigent defense improvement.
If the Commission doesn’t have the resources to collect the data, it surely won’t be able to analyze the data and turn that data into vital suggestions for indigent defense system reform.
However, as strange as it seems, even when the Commission does
promulgate and implement rules regarding training, education, and data collection, the Legislature gave it no power to enforce those rules.314
305. See Jared C. Hoskins, Final Report to the Idaho Justice Commission’s Public
Defense Subcommittee, HOSKINS LAW & POLICY GROUP, PLLC, 60 (2013),
http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/document/hoskins_final_report. These recommendations
were advanced in the Final Report to the Idaho Justice Commission’s Public Defense Subcommittee.
306. IDAHO CODE §19-850 (1)(a) (2012).
307. § 19-850(1) (2012).
308. See § 19-850(1)(a)(ii). See update in note 343, infra.
309. See § 19-850 (1)(a).
310. See id. See update in note 343, infra.
311. H.R. 634, 62nd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2014). The Commission’s budget for
the 2014-15 fiscal year is $300,000. This number included the 1.5 full-time Commission staff
members. Thomson, supra note 132, at 15.
312. See id. See update in note 293, supra.
313. Hoskins, supra note 305, at 68.
314. See § 19-850(1); Complaint, supra note 6, at 20. See update in note 343, infra
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The statute gives the Commission power to create rules but leaves it
with no statutory enforcement mechanism.315 This essentially creates a
Commission that is devoid of holding anyone who violates its rules accountable.316
The Public Defense Commission’s third flaw is that it violates principle 4 and 5. The Legislature gave the Commission no power to implement any national standards of public defense delivery systems.317 For
example, the Commission is unable to set workload standards and limits
recommended by ABA principle 5 and desperately needed by Idaho’s
overworked public defenders.318 Additionally, the statute gives no power
for the Commission to create rules and regulations for ensuring that
public defenders are provided with confidential and private meeting
spaces for client meetings, which is recommended by principle 4, and a
problem occurring in many of Idaho’s courthouses.319
Even with its flaws, the Commission is a step in the right direction
for indigent defense reform in Idaho, but the Legislature has a long way
to go before the steps it has taken will begin to effect meaningful change
for Idaho’s indigent defendants. First, the Commission needs to comply
with the ABA’s principles for indigent defense delivery systems. Next,
the Legislature needs to supply the Commission with more money, more
people, and more power so that it can collect the necessary data and analyze that data to help best effectuate indigent defense reform in Idaho.
Even though home makeover shows give the impression that homes can
be built (or re-built) within a matter of days, a structurally sound house
can’t be built overnight. It requires money, people, and power.
IV. RECONSTRUCTING A SOLID FOUNDATION: IDAHO’S NEED
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM
All three branches of Idaho’s government have recognized that the
current indigent defense system is broken.320 But while all three see the

315. See § 19-850(1).
316. Id.
317. Id.; e.g., Ten Principles, supra note 59. As a comparison, in the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) & (5) (West 2013) Congress gave the Environmental Protection Agency the power to enforce the Act through civil lawsuits, the power to issue orders, and the
power to impose penalties on violators of the Act. Generally, Congress must give power to the
agency or commission to enforce its rules. If Congress intends for the agency or commission
to have enforcement power, it says so. See generally id. See update in note 343, infra.
318. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2–3.
319. Id. at 2.
320. Idaho Transportation Department, State of the State and Budget Address,
Transcript
of
Address,
THE
TRANSPORTER,
Jan.
12,
2015,
http://itd.idaho.gov/transporter/2015/011615_Trans/011615_StateoftheState.html.
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problem––and one branch has taken small steps toward fixing it––none
is doing enough.
What they are doing, at least, is talking about the crisis. For example, in January 2015, the Governor delivered his State of the State and
Budget Address.321 In that Address, he acknowledged the importance of
overhauling Idaho’s public defender system:
The courts have made it clear that our current method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass
constitutional muster. This is a priority for our counties so it also must be a priority for us. If we value the ideals embodied in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, then it is undeniably our responsibility to take the
phrase “due process of law” as seriously as the Framers intended.322
As support for Idaho’s serious new stance, and in acknowledgement of
each branch’s inherent role in tripartite government, the Governor
called the Legislature to action: he encouraged legislators to create
meaningful change by continuing the reform efforts.323
After such a long period of inaction, the Governor’s words are promising. But they are incomplete. This could be in part because the Executive Branch is generally limited to enforcing the Legislature’s laws,
which means that the Executive Branch must wait for those laws to exist. But in the meantime, the Executive Branch could do more than talk.
It could act. It could—perhaps by proposing practical steps for meaningful reform—help the Legislature do its job, which would bring Idaho
closer to fulfilling its responsibility to offer adequate due process. However, those sorts of specific suggestions have yet to come.324
Possibly because of its particular expertise, Idaho’s Judicial Branch
identified the need for monumental change to the State’s public defense
system a little earlier than the Executive Branch did.325 More than a
year before the Governor addressed the crisis in his annual remarks, the
Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court noted the State’s long history
of safeguarding indigent defense:
[S]ince 1923 Idahoans have had the right for every “reasonable
opportunity” to prepare a defense. This starts with time––time
to interview, investigate and prepare legal arguments. All of
Idaho public defense attorneys do not have that time. Appropriate caseload numbers exist from state and national organiza321. Id.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See Kathy Griesmyer, Governor Otter Falls Short on His Commitment to the
Constitution, ACLU OF IDAHO (Jan. 10, 2014), https://acluidaho.org/governor-otter-fallsshort-on-his-commitment-to-the-constitution/.
325. See Remarks, supra note 269.
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tions. These should be closely examined by the interim committee and made enforceable. Every reasonable opportunity for a
fair and impartial trial should include competent attorneys who
are trained and have an experience level commensurate with the
case or crime. . . . It has been the duty of this state before statehood and continues today. It is our duty to protect these fundamental ideals for the future.326
The Judicial Branch’s well-established role as interpreter of the
law gives it a good platform from which to protect those ideals.327 As the
branch invested with the authority to say what the law is, the judiciary
could move indigent defense reform forward through precedential rulings.328 And judicial guidance would be welcome, especially because “the
legislature has been on notice for years and has failed to act. . . .”329
But the Judicial Branch has more to offer than just legal interpretation. In Idaho, it is also responsible for supervising attorneys.330 Under
that part of its power, the judiciary could promulgate rules requiring
stricter adherence to model indigent defense standards.331 Those rules—
which could, for instance, cap public defenders’ caseloads—would benefit
both the overburdened lawyers and the clients they serve.332
Though the judiciary can help remedy the problem, both by interpreting existing laws and by creating attorney rules in the same spirit,
its power is limited.333 Judges can interpret only those laws the Legislature creates.334 Thus, given its traditional role as the architect of laws,
the Legislature is actually in the prime position to fix Idaho’s system.
And it has tried. The legislative branch is currently the only one of
the three to have gone beyond conversation and into action.335 Recognizing the need for indigent defense reform, the Legislature created the
Public Defense Interim Committee in 2013.336 As noted earlier, the
Committee quickly proposed two pieces of legislation, both aimed at improving the system in Idaho.337 The legislation passed in 2014.338
326. Id.
327. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 820 P.2d 1206, 1211, 120 Idaho 849, 853 (Idaho 1991).
328. Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 450 (2009).
329. Id.
330. See
generally
Judicial
Branch,
Idaho
Blue
Book,
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/elect/bluebook/2016/00_Intro.pdf (last visited March 10, 2016).
331. See Drinan, supra note 328, at 450.
332. See generally id.
333. See generally Marbury, supra note 327; J.R. Simplot Co., supra note 327.
334. See generally Marbury, supra note 327; J.R. Simplot Co., supra note 327.
335. See generally IDAHO CODE § 19-859 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 19-849 (2015).
336. H.R. Res. 26, supra note 263.
337. See HRC 40, supra note 264; IDAHO CODE § 19-849; IDAHO CODE § 19-859.
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Despite the Legislature’s efforts, the recent statutes are not likely
to do much to advance indigent defense reform.339 Although the statutes
show that the Legislature is aware of the problem and is trying to correct it, the new laws do not achieve the critical reform Idaho needs.340
Maybe that’s because new isn’t always better—especially when there is
a pre-existing blueprint for constructing an ideal indigent defense delivery system.341
Instead of trying to make something from nothing, the Legislature
could look for guidance to the design the ABA has already drawn up; it
could codify the ten principles of a constitutional indigent defense delivery system.342 While that is not the only approach Idaho could take, it is
one way the legislative branch could produce sustainable reform. But
whatever option it chooses, Idaho should pick quickly: litigation against
the State has arrived.
A. Idaho’s Third-Generation Litigation
At the end of its 2015 Legislative session, Idaho again failed to
fund or improve its indigent defense system.343 Because of that failure, a
class-action civil rights lawsuit on this issue was filed on June 17,
2015.344 As one of three remaining states not providing state-funded indigent defense, Idaho was at particular risk of being sued by a watchdog
group aiming to force the State to change its ways.345 Idaho is out of
time to change its ways as the ACLU, ACLU of Idaho, and the global
law firm Hogan Lovells filed a lawsuit on behalf of defendants who were

338. H.R. 542, supra note 303. For an update, see note 343, infra.
339. Id.
340. See supra Part III.C.
341. See supra Part II.C.2.
342. See infra Part IV.B.
343. Complaint, supra note 6, at 3. The ACLU lawsuit may have been enough to
force legislators to make much needed changes to Idaho’s crumbling system. In fact, March
2016, proved to be a victorious month for Idaho’s indigent defendants. “On March 15, 2016,
the Idaho Senate unanimously voted to enact . . . HB 504 – a bill with the expressed legislative purpose of ‘improving the delivery of trial-level indigent defense services by providing
funding to counties and creating standards with which counties must comply.’ The bill had
previously passed the House . . . and authorizes the Idaho State Public Defense Commission .
. . to promulgate and enforce standards, collect uniform data, enforce a ban on flat fee contracting, and grant state monies to counties.” David Carroll, Idaho Empowers State Commission with New Authorities and New Funding, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-empowers-state-commission-with-new-authorities-andnew-funding/. This is a victory (even if a small one) for Idaho because HB 504 now requires
the Idaho State Public Defense commission to promulgate standards that are consisted with
the ABA’s Ten Priciples of a Public Defense Delivery System, which is exactly something this
article advocates for. David Carroll, Idaho Empowers State Commission with New Authorities
and
New
Funding,
SIXTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER
(Mar.
23,
2016),
http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-empowers-state-commission-with-new-authorities-andnew-funding/.
344. Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
345. Hoskins, supra note 305, at 72–73; Boydston, supra note 13.
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deprived constitutionally adequate representation in Idaho.346 Lawsuits
of this type—called third-generation indigent defense litigation—have
been successful in other jurisdictions as a last resort for reform.347
In fact, one of the earliest examples of a successful third-generation
lawsuit targeted Idaho’s eastern neighbor, Montana. Before the lawsuit,
which the ACLU initiated in 2002, Montana’s indigent defense system
was a mixed bag of private contract attorneys, county-employed defenders, and judge-appointed private attorneys.348 Even employing all of
those methods of delivering indigent defense services, however, the
State was failing to fulfill its duty to provide adequate counsel.349
In response to widespread dissatisfaction with Montana’s patchwork, county-operated system—which often led to disparities in the
quality of representation from county to county—the ACLU filed a lawsuit in 2002 against seven counties in Montana.350 That lawsuit challenged the constitutionality of the State’s indigent defense system and
sought to reform it.351 Although Montana courts were not forced to resolve the litigation because the Legislature acted before the end of the
litigation, the ACLU lawsuit is often cited as the catalyst for change
that prompted Montana to reform its ailing indigent defense system.352
That reformation came in 2005, when the Montana Legislature
passed the Montana Public Defender Act.353 The Act created a statewide public defense system, which completely overhauled the old county-operated system.354 Montana’s new system included a state oversight
commission, ensured that adequate funding for indigent defense was
provided by the state, and included an office of the state public defender,
which prepared regional plans and caseload management programs.355
Legal experts, including the ACLU of Idaho (the group that is perhaps best suited to know), have been warning Idaho legislators since the
2010 Defender Association’s report that the State’s current public de-

346. Leo Morales, ACLU Sues Idaho over Defective Public Defense System (June 17,
2015), http://acluidaho.org/aclu-sues-idaho-over-defective-public-defense-system/.
347. Id. at 73 (“If policy makers are unable or unwilling to address systematic concerns with Idaho’s indigent defense system, litigation could be considered as a last resort.”).
348. Jessa DeSimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public Defender
Act, 96 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479, 1494–95 (2006).
349. Id. at 1498.
350. Id. at 1498–99.
351. ACLU OF MONTANA, MONTANA’S PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM: AN EVALUATION
FIVE
YEARS
INTO
THE
STATEWIDE
SYSTEM
3
(2011),
http://publicdefender.mt.gov/forms/pdf/ACLUmontanaopdreport.pdf; DeSimone, supra note
348, at 1498.
352. DeSimone, supra note 348, at 1498.
353. Id. at 1504.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1505–07.
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fense system could be ripe for litigation.356 The day has come. Litigation
against Idaho is now pending, which shows that such warnings should
not have been taken lightly. As Montana’s experience shows, lawsuits
brought on behalf of indigent defendants, especially lawsuits with the
backing of national organizations like the ACLU, can trigger needed
change, but they do so at a high cost. Third-generation litigation is expensive.357
Now that a lawsuit has been initiated against the state, Idaho will
of course have to spend money litigating the lawsuit.358 And that expenditure is in addition to the cost of making the necessary systemic
changes themselves.359 Idaho would certainly have saved money if it
took action before being forced. But by failing to move toward meaningful reform before the ACLU commenced its litigation, Idaho now has to
spend the money on defending a lawsuit instead of on something of real
value: a systematic public defense program that has the necessary funding, is properly administered, and divides resources evenly among the
prosecution and defense functions.360
B. Codifying the Ten ABA Principles
Idaho does not have to wait for a lawsuit to arrive to get some help
identifying how to improve its system. The template for a functioning
model exists outside of a Complaint’s demands. To build a constitutional
foundation for delivering indigent defense services, Idaho needs only to
look to the ABA’s ten principles.361 Codifying those principles as part of

356. IDAHO PRESS-TRIBUNE, supra note 267. There are six principles that call for initiating litigation to prompt public defense reform: 1) litigation should be instituted on behalf
of all or a class of indigent defendants so that a positive result will impact a large group of
defendants; 2) litigation should be instituted pretrial, rather than post-conviction, thereby
avoiding the need to demonstrate prejudice; 3) legal representation should be provided by
disinterested lawyers experienced in civil litigation serving as pro bono counsel; 4) strong
factual support that shows how the system adversely affects indigent defendants should be
assembled and presented; 5) counsel should present to the appropriate court persuasive legal
authority to justify judicial intervention; and 6) media coverage and public support should be
encouraged. See Justice Denied, supra note 72, at 141.
357. See Hoskins, supra note 305, at 72–73.
358. See Boydston, supra note 13. On December 16, 2015, attorneys for the State argued a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs sued the wrong defendants. Id.
The right defendants, the State argued, are the individual counties, county commissioners,
and district judges, as Idaho does not have a state-wide public defense system but, by statute, indigent defense is provided at the county level and it is not the State’s responsibility.
Id. Conversely, the plaintiff’s attorneys argued that the counties and county officials do not
have the resources, guidance, or training necessary to carry out the indigent defense responsibilities. Id. Ironically, the State’s attorneys are using Idaho’s problem as its defense.
359. See id.
360. DeSimone, supra note 348, at 1507; see Hoskins, supra note 305, at 72–73.
361. Minutes, PUBLIC DEFENSE REFORM INTERIM COMMITTEE (September 12, 2013),
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2013/interim/defense0912min.pdf. See update in note
343, supra.
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a statewide oversight system would put Idaho one step closer to sustainable indigent defense reform.362
As discussed in Part II.C.2, each of the ten principles represents
one facet of a structurally sound public defense delivery system.363 With
each principle it codifies, then, Idaho adds one support beam to a badly
decaying infrastructure. If, for example, Idaho were to adopt Principles
2 and 5, which are aimed at caseload control, individual public defenders could provide better representation because workload caps would
give them more time with each defendant.364 Codification of Principle 4
would give each defendant a private space in which to meet with his attorney, a critical component to preserving the client’s right to confidentiality and encouraging him to participate in his own defense.365 And,
maybe most importantly for the defendants themselves (and for fulfilling Gideon’s promise), adopting Principle 3 would ensure that every
defendant is promptly appointed an attorney, regardless of his ability to
pay for one.366
Codified together, the ABA’s ten principles would provide Idaho a
strong foundation for indigent defense delivery. But, as structurally
necessary as they are, the principles are actually only constitutional
minimums.367 States can do more. If Idaho chooses to lay the groundwork for solid and lasting indigent defense reform with the ABA principles, it can then build on top of that base by removing the responsibility
of indigent defense services from counties, where it currently resides. To
finish the job—and ensure once and for all that defendants are afforded
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel—Idaho should take responsibility back from its counties and provide financing, oversight and countyoperated public defender offices.
C. State-managed, County-operated Dedicated Public Defender Offices
On average, each state in this country spends $11.86 per person on
indigent defense.368 By contrast, Idaho spends only $7.83—more than
362. Indigent Defense, ACLU OF IDAHO, https://acluidaho.org/issues/criminaljustice/indigent-defense/ (last visited March 10, 2016). Of course, the Legislature would also
have to include an appropriate enforcement mechanism to ensure that the minimums set out
in the principles are being met. It could include enforcement tools as part of the reimagined
statute, for example, or authorize a state agency to promulgate rules for compliance.
363. See supra Part II.C.2.
364. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: ADDRESSING DEFICIENCIES IN IDAHO’S PUBLIC
DEFENSE SYSTEM, ACLU OF IDAHO 4 (last visited March 10, 2016),
http://acluidaho.org/wpsite/wp-content/uploads/Gideon-Legs-Booklet-Final.pdf [hereinafter
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM].
365. Id. at 5.
366. CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 364, at 5.
367. NLADA, supra note 7, at 6.
368. See id. at 4.
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four dollars less per person than the national average.369 In fact, Idaho
has one of the lowest state indigent defense expenditures in the country,
ranking forty-second out of fifty.370 Idaho also falls well below the national average on per-capita spending on indigent defense, with a similarly dismal ranking of forty-second out of fifty.371
These numbers do not have to be the end of the story for Idaho,
though. Other states have seen improvement in both raw numbers and
ranking as they have transitioned to providing state-based indigent defense services.372 Idaho could follow a similar trajectory if it creates a
state-based system instead of continuing on with its county-operated
system.373
Support for such an idea is both statewide and national. Many organizations and entities are currently pushing for exactly this kind of
public defense reform.374 Recently, for example, individual counties
joined together in an attempt to convince the State Legislature that reform is desperately needed in Idaho.375
In September 2014, County officials from across the State gathered
at the Idaho Association of Counties Convention.376 There, officials made
clear that indigent defense reform was one of the County Association’s
priorities and suggested that the State should take over control of indigent defense rather than leaving the burden on individual counties.377
One County even proposed a resolution that would have accomplished
exactly that, giving the State government responsibility for overseeing
and implementing a state public defender system.378 The County Association approved the resolution,379 but the Idaho Public Defense Reform
Interim Committee voted against it in November 2014.380 As a result of
the Committee’s de facto veto, individual counties remain in control of
indigent defense in Idaho.381

369. See id.
370. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES,
FY 2008-2012-UPDATED, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/idsus0812.pdf; NAT’L LEGAL AID
& DEFENDER ASS’N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM, SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL
CRISIS
iii
(2008),
http://courts.mi.gov/education/mji/Documents/2014/MI%20Indigent%20Defense.pdf.
371. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 4.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. See, e.g., Idaho Association of Counties Resolution Number 2014-01, IDAHO
ASSOCIATION
OF
COUNTIES
(Feb.
5,
2014),
https://acluidaho.org/wpsite/wpcontent/uploads/IAC-Public-Defender-Resolution-2014-01.pdf.
375. See, e.g., Kathy Hedberg, Counties Want to Hand Off Public Defense to State,
LEWISTON TRIBUNE, Sept. 16, 2014, at C1.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Kootenai County proposed the resolution. See Idaho Association of Counties
Resolution Number 2014-01, supra note 374.
379. Id.
380. IDAHO PRESS-TRIBUNE, supra note 267.
381. Id.

2016

COSMETIC REPAIR TO A CRUMBLING
FOUNDATION: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF IDAHO’S MOST RECENT INDIGENT
DEFENSE LEGISLATION

711

This development is disheartening because a radical departure
from the current county-operated system would do Idaho good.382 As the
County Association’s resolution recognized, a district-wide office with
state oversight deserves consideration from state legislators.383 It is true
that there are several models available to reformers trying to design a
new indigent defense delivery system;384 but of these options, a state
oversight system best protects a defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel.385 A state-managed system is best because it could potentially
provide uniform practice standards, uniform hiring guidelines, and uniform budgetary controls for county-operated offices. Because it is best,
Idaho should implement a state-managed system that provides for county-operated dedicated public defender offices. Doing so will ensure that,
as Idaho fixes the footing of its indigent defense system, it constructs a
durable, high-quality structure atop that base.
Aside from assuring that Idaho’s future indigent defense delivery
system is built to last, creating a state-managed, county-operated model
has another benefit: it most closely tracks recent guidance from the federal government about how to safeguard the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.386 Last year, in the course of third-generation litigation in New
York state court, the U.S. Attorney General submitted a Statement of
Interest outlining the federal government’s views on public defense reform.387 Interestingly, the Attorney General chose to comment in a case
challenging a system that looks very much like the one currently in effect in Idaho; the New York lawsuit alleged that the State’s public defender system, which the State conferred upon the counties, resulted in
inadequate representation for indigent defendants.388
382. William Wellman, Indigent Defense Deserves the Serious Reform Now Being
Considered,
Vol.
56,
THE
ADVOCATE
at
16
(2013),
https://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/adv13oct.pdf.
383. Id.
384. See supra Part II.B.
385. See Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Public Defense in New York State,
NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nyclu.org/news/settlementbegins-historic-reformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state [hereinafter Settlement].
386. See generally Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Hurrell-Harring v.
New
York,
Index
No.
8866-07
(New
York
2014),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/hurrell_soi_9-25-14.pdf.
387. Settlement, supra note 385. For context, the New York case reached a settlement in October 2014. The settlement overhauled the public defender systems in five counties throughout the state. The lawsuit that was the catalyst for the settlement agreement
alleged that the state’s public defender system, which the state conferred upon the counties,
resulted in inadequate representation for indigent defendants. The settlement agreement
contains many provisions for the improvement of indigent defense including requiring attorneys present at first appearances, increasing staff attorneys to ensure all indigent clients
have lawyers, and implementing caseload maximum standards.
388. Settlement, supra note 385.
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The Attorney General’s Statement in the New York case was notable, as it marked the first time the U.S. Department of Justice has expressed in state court its opinion about how states provide indigent defense.389 The Statement proposed that states be held accountable––by
third-generation lawsuits or federal government intervention––if they
fail to provide adequate legal services to indigent people accused of
crimes.390 And after taking such an unprecedented step to add the federal government’s voice to the dialogue about state public defense systems, the Attorney General did not mince words:
The United States has an interest in ensuring that all jurisdictions—federal, state, and local—are fulfilling their obligation
under the Constitution to provide effective assistance of counsel
to individuals facing criminal charges who cannot afford an attorney, as required by Gideon. . . . It’s time to reclaim Gideon’s
petition—and resolve to confront the obstacles facing indigent
defense providers.391
Thus, it appears that even the Department of Justice—recognizing the
country’s deficiencies in indigent defense and reflecting its natural inclination to protect constitutional rights—has identified a statemanaged system based on ABA principles as the best solution to the
problem.392
Whatever else it does, the federal government’s position definitely
reflects one particular understanding: without guidance from the state,
counties will continue, inadvertently or intentionally, to neglect their
obligations to provide defendants with the counsel they are constitutionally guaranteed.393 Unless Idaho wants to be next on the Attorney
General’s radar, it needs to engage in an indigent defense delivery system overhaul and reassume its constitutional responsibility.394
389. Id. The Attorney General had previously submitted a Statement of Interest in
federal court in 2013. See generally Statement of Interest of the United States, Wilbur v. City
of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d. 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. C11-1100RSL).
390. Settlement, supra note 385.
391. Hurrell-Harring, supra note 386, at 2.
392. See generally id.
393. NLADA, supra note 7, at 52.
394. Idaho is too late. The Department of Justice’s interest in Idaho’s deficiencies is
now evident. In April, 2016, (as this article was in its final stages of editing) the DOJ “moved
for permission from the Idaho Supreme Court to file an amicus brief supporting the ACLU. . .
. In support of its motion, the [DOJ] cited ‘the United States’ strong interest in ensuring that
indigent criminal defendnts receive the full measure of rights the constitution guarantees, as
well as its practical expertise in access-to-justice issues.’” See Motion for Leave to File Brief
as Amicus Curiae, Tucker v. Idaho, No. 43922-2016 (Idaho Apr. 29, 2016),
https://idreports.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/2016-04-29-supp-mot-for-brief-amicuscuriae.pdf; Defendants-Respondents’ Response to United States of America’s Motion for
Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae, Tucker v. Idaho, NO. 43922-2016 (Idaho Apr. 28,
2016),
https://idreports.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/tucker-v-state-of-idaho-defendentsbrief.pdf; see also Sam Wright, Public Defender Roundup, ABOVE THE LAW (May 10, 2016),
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/05/public-defender-roundup/.
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Even the leading experts in indigent defense reform are not sure
what that overhaul looks like for Idaho.395 But what is clear is that the
most recent steps are not enough. Because “[t]he state is obliged to ensure that the counties are capable of meeting [Gideon’s] obligations and
that counties actually do so,” Idaho must act now.396 As “the original obligor,” Idaho must step in and succeed where its counties have failed.397
Idaho must create a state-managed, county-operated network of dedicated public defender offices.
State funding for county-operated dedicated public defender offices
is the best delivery method for protecting indigent defendant’s constitutional rights in Idaho. To employ this system, the Legislature could
begin the renovation by codifying the ABA’s ten principles. Additionally,
the Legislature could give the existing Commission the power to create a
public defender hiring agency, which could create guidelines for hiring
government employees that meet certain industry standards. And to
achieve systemic quality representation, the Commission could provide
those defenders with training, guidance, operating manuals, and information on best practices.
V. CONCLUSION
Forty states throughout the country currently have some form of
state oversight of their indigent defense delivery system.398 It is time for
Idaho to join them. Doing so will allow Idaho to rebuild a solid structure
where one is presently rotting away.
Indigent defendants in Idaho need public defense reform now. They
are the ones paying the highest price because of Idaho’s crumbling foundation. A person stands to lose his liberty, or even his life, when indigent defense delivery systems are insufficient.399 If defendants do not
have adequate representation, it can be, literally, a matter of life and
death.400
Idaho’s recent past is riddled with constitutional violations that
need immediate, reconstructive attention. If meaningful indigent defense reform does not arrive in Idaho soon, the State’s government officials risk costly third-generation litigation. These lawsuits will come
even though “Idaho’s public defenders are not bad lawyers—they’ve
395. See generally Hoskins, supra note 305.
396. Id. at 6.
397. See id.
398. Hoskins, supra note 305.
399. Ritchie Eppink, “The Joke’s On Us”: Pausing to Reflect on the 50th Anniversary
of Gideon v. Wainwright, Vol. 56, THE ADVOCATE at 18 (Jan. 2013),
https://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/adv13jan.pdf.
400. See id.
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simply been given the impossible task of representing too many clients
with too few resources.”401
But as distressing as the ramifications will be for Idaho officials,
maintaining the status quo will have an even more devastating impact
on Idaho’s indigent defendants. If Idaho continues trying to fix a structural problem with cosmetic touch-ups—or trying to build a new framework without first laying the proper foundation—its indigent defense
system will, before long, come crashing down on top of it.402
Bonnie C. Groller∗∗

401. Id.
402. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1, at 79 (“He who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble
to the architect and danger to the building.”).
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